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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
KENNETH W. GIBB, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
EARL N. DORIUS, Director, Driver 
License Division, State of Utah, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 
13626 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Is the revocation of respondent's driver's license, pur-
suant to Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10 (1953), as amended, 
for failure to take the chemical test, a refusal, when 
respondent, relying on advice of counsel, refuses to sub-
mit to the test until his attorney is present, after having 
had two phone calls with said attorney; is the right to con-
tact counsel a right under the Hunter v. Dorius case to 
have the attorney present prior to the taking of the chem-
ical test or deciding to take the chemical test, or either 
submitting or refusing said test; further, are the above two 
issues moot in view of the court's ruling that Section 41-
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6-44.10 (f) was not complied with in the court's opinion 
because Lynn Davis, City-County Health Lab Technician, 
was not "an authorized lab technician" pursuant to the 
statute? 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
On October 8, 1973, the appellant revoked respon-
dent's driver's license to drive for one year, effective Sep-
tember 13, 1973. This was due to respondent's failure to 
submit to a sobriety test under Section 41-6-44.10, Utah 
Code Annotated (1953), as amended. Pursuant to the 
act, respondent filed a petition for trial de novo in the 
Third District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, for 
a determination of whether respondent's license was sub-
ject to revocation. The case was heard before the Honor-
able D. Frank Wilkins on the 18th day of December, 
1973. Judge Wilkins found after a hearing that respon-
dent's motion to set aside the revocation order be granted 
and that the action be dismissed upon the merits and 
that the respondent have and recover his driving privilege. 
Said order was signed and entered on the 29th day of 
January, 1974. According to the conclusions of law en-
tered by the court of date, Judge Wilkins held that the 
order entered on the 8th of October, 1973, was unlawful 
and in excess of appellant's authority and jurisdiction; 
further, that the petitioner had a right to rely upon the 
representations made by the arresting officer that he had 
a right to counsel, and that the arresting officer was in 
error, after informing petitioner of his right and refusing 
to allow him to obtain such counsel prior to requesting 
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that he either submit or refuse a chemical test for sobri-
ety. Further, that the question of petitioner's refusal 
to submit to a chemical test was moot in light of the fact 
that the State failed to prove a duly authorized k b tech-
nician as required in Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10(f) 
(1953), as amended, was provided. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a reversal of the lower court's judg-
ment findings of fact and conclusions of law granting a 
return of the respondent's driver's license and seeks an 
order in harmony with the appellant's order of revocation. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Trooper Wayne Albert Smith testified that respon-
dent was observed in a Chevrolet Pickup Truck going 
northbound on Interstate 1-15 Freeway and turning into 
the emergency lane and then going off onto the shoulder 
portion of the road in a zigzag pattern (R. 33). The 
trooper followed him from just north of 17th South until 
stopping the subject's car at approximately 12th South. 
He noticed the odor of alcohol (R. 33, 34) and he asked 
Mr. Gibb, the respondent, to step back to the highway 
patrol vehicle and as he did so he observed the respondent 
walking, which he indicated was in a staggering and 
unsteady manner. No field agility tests were given (R. 
34). Trooper Smith placed him under arrest and read 
him the Miranda rights (R. 35) and respondent indicated 
that he would talk to the Trooper (R. 35). Trooper Smith 
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asked the respondent if he would submit to a chemical 
test and asked him if he had a preference as to which 
test he would take, to which the respondent indicated he 
had no preference, but that if it was okay, he would take 
the blood test. The Trooper then called the dispatcher 
to notify the technician for the purpose of drawing the 
blood to meet at the county jail (R. 35). The respondent 
was stopped at 4:01 a.m. on May 17,1973. He was placed 
under arrest at 4:04 a.m. He was advised of his rights 
at 4:09 a.m. (R. 35). 
Thereafter, the respondent and Trooper Smith and 
another highway patrolman, Trooper Tenney, proceeded 
to the Salt Lake County Jail. Trooper Smith in the car 
explained the implication of the Implied Consent Law 
and the chemical test to the respondent, but did not 
read the entire rights to him at the scene prior to leaving 
for the jail. He did tell him that he was required to take 
a test and that his license would be revoked if he refused 
and did not have a valid reason for the refusal. The re-
spondent and Trooper Smith and Trooper Tenney ar-
rived at the jail and there met Mr. Lynn Davis, the City-
County Lab Technician who was there for the purpose 
of drawing the blood (R. 37). The respondent asked to 
speak to an attorney and so Trooper Smith provided him 
with a phone, the respondent made several phone calls 
and then did contact an attorney represented to be Mr. 
Reagan (R. 37). Mr. Gibb, after his conversation, re-
quested that Trooper Smith talk to the attorney, which 
conversation took place (R. 37) at which time Trooper 
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Smith asked that his client subject himself to a chemical 
test, either breath or blood (R. 37). Trooper Smith testi-
fied that Mr. Reagan said that he would not refuse the 
test (that is his client) supplied but that he would not 
agree to Mr. Gibb taking a test without him (Mr. Reagan) 
being present at the jail(R. 38). Mr. Reagan, the attor-
ney, was informed by Trooper Smith that he had no in-
tention of interrogating Mr. Gibb at the jail further con-
cerning the arrest for drunk driving or taking any of his 
rights away but that he did request that he get an answer 
as to whether Mr. Gibb could take the chemical test or 
not and that Trooper Smith was the only other car on 
the road that night and it was important for him to get 
back to the highway (R. 38). These activities took place 
between 4:45 a.m., the approximate time they arrived 
at the jail and 5:30 a.m., the time that Trooper Smith 
turned the respondent, Mr. Gibb, over to the jailer for 
booking. 
Trooper Smith testified that the respondent had a 
lengthy conversation with his attorney, approximately 
five or ten mintues, and could have been as much as 
fifteen (R. 38-39). Mr. Gibb's attorney advised Trooper 
Smith that he would not advise Mr. Gibb over the phone 
and that he was going to come to the jail to speak to 
Mr. Gibb in private, and Mr. Gibb's attorney informed 
Mr. Gibb that he was coming to the jail to advise him 
whether or not to submit to the chemical test. Trooper 
Smith advised both the attorney for Mr. Gibb and Mr. 
Gibb that there was no need for the attorney to come to 
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the county jail as far as the implied consent was con-
cerned (R. 41) whereupon respondent, Mr. Gibb, said 
that subsequent to him being informed of his rights un-
der Section 41-6-44.10 that he would not submit to a test 
unless his attorney was present. However, the record 
reveals that he admitted to Mr. Davis, the technician, 
affirmatively that he would refuse until his attorney was 
present (R. 26). Attorney Reagan, attorney for respon-
dent, stated by way of a stipulation that he arrived at 
the jail at 5:25 a.m. and that on the phone prior to coming 
to the jail, he notified Trooper Smith that in his opinion 
what constituted right to counsel was not a phone call 
but was the opportunity to personally interview and talk 
to his client, to which Trooper Smith reiterated to attor-
ney Reagan that his presence was not necessary as far 
as the law and the refusal was concerned (R. 48). 
The respondent, in. talking to the lab technician said 
that at the time when he was asked if he would submit 
to the test that he would refuse until his attorney was 
present because if "we took his blood, he would lose his 
license, but if he refused and we didn't wait for his attor-
ney, he could get by ttw refusal hearing" (R. 26). (Em-
phasis supplied.) 
On cross-examination after having testified as to his 
qualifications, Mr. Lynn Davis, a chemist with the City-
County Health Department for the previous nine and 
one-half years, a medical technologist with the United 
States Navy during World War II, and holding a bachelor 
of arts degree in Bacteriology and Chemistry, with ap-
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proximately twenty-five years' experience in clinical lab-
oratory work, that he did not have on his person a card 
or writing of any kind that indicated that he was author-
ized to draw blood by the State of Utah (R. 30). How-
ever, he did indicate he was authorized by the State Di-
vision of Health and was on the approved list with the 
State Department of Health and that the State Depart-
ment of Health monitored him as to his procedure in 
running blood alcohol tests (R. 20). He indicated that 
the authorization was in the form of a letter as to his 
proficiency rating on the program of the State Division 
of Health (R. 29). However, Mr. Davis answered Mr. 
Gibb's attorney that he did not have a card from the 
State of Utah, that he did have a card from the Director 
of the City-County Health Department reflecting his 
employment and authorization status. 
The lower court's decision should be reversed for the 
following reasons: 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT 
THE QUESTION OF PETITIONER'S RE-
FUSAL TO SUBMIT TO A CHEMICAL TEST 
WAS MOOT BASED ON THE RULING 
THAT THE CITY AND COUNTY LAB 
TECHNICIAN WAS NOT A "DULY AUTH-
ORIZED LABORATORY TECHNICIAN" AS 
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REQUIRED UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. § 
41-6-44.10 (f). 
There is no specific case law on this subject as to 
what constitutes a duly authorized laboratory technician 
under the law in the State of Utah. However, the ques-
tion as to what is a "duly authorized" agent or person 
has been ruled on in other jurisdictions. A case in point 
being an Indiana case of March, 1942, Wise v. Curdes, 
et al.y 40 N. E. 2d 122, held on a question of what con-
stitutes duly authorized as used in the bankruptcy act 
that where an attorney had been directed to act for a 
client and is acting within the scope of the agency it is 
binding notwithstanding the absence of writing to that 
effect or a formal power of attorney. A New York case, 
People v. Johanerson, 49 N. Y. S. 2d 190, 199 (1944), on 
question of a chiropractor and the practice of medicine 
held that duly authorized by law meant authority under 
the laws of the State and would require a medical decree 
since the statute required one to practice. A more recent 
case in Texas concerning a physician on a dispute as to 
whether a physician licensed in one county could certify 
pursuant to the election code for another county, the 
court held in Olivarez v. Aquilar, Tex. Civ. App., 431 
S. W. 2d 932 (1968), that a physician whose medical cer-
tificate was registered in Zapata County and who resided 
in the county was a "duly licenced physician" within the 
meaning of the election code and authorized to execute 
medical certificates in support of application of voters 
in Star County for absentee ballot for primary election 
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involving nomination for office and a constable in Star 
County. 
Two insurance cases likewise sustain the proposition 
that a duly authorized agent refers not only to the form 
but includes form and substance. Rosenthaul v. Monarch 
Life Insurance Company, a 1935 case from the Supreme 
Judicial Court of Massachusetts, 195 N. E. 339, involved 
a suit brought to secure a decree to the effect that a policy 
of accident and health indemnity insurance issued to the 
plaintiff was reinstated after a lapse as in full force and 
effect. The problem was that the insured's check for the 
overdue payment of premium was received by the agent, 
deposited to the credit of the insurer, in its bank, and 
was duly collected and the proceeds held by the insurer 
for almost two weeks. The court held that the agent 
accepted the check in payment of the overdue premium 
and that the duly authorized agent as used in the statute 
providing for reinstatement referred to the representative 
of the insurer with power to collect regular premiums and 
in this case the last previous one paid by the insured and 
upheld the reinstatement and the effect of the insurance 
as being in force. A second Massachusetts case in the 
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, March 1, 
1917, is Lamontagne v. Standard Life and Accident In-
surance Company, 115 N. E. 244. There the question was 
whether there was evidence which would warrant a find-
ing that the defendant insurance company was not liable 
unless plaintiff had complied with their "immediate writ-
ten notice" requirement that a notice of the claim be 
given to the company at its home office or "its duly 
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authorized agent" There was no notice to the home 
office. However, the question was whether notice to an 
agent empowered to issue a policy, received premiums 
to be forwarded to the home office less the agent's com-
mission, and who in fact had received from the insurance 
company a general agent's commission on general liability 
insurance business, was such a person as would constitute 
a duly authorized agent for receiving notice on an acci-
dent. The jury found that the sales agent was clothed 
with sufficient powers that the plaintiff who gave the 
agent notice was justified in assuming that it would be 
a sufficient compliance with that condition within the 
policy. The Court sustained the lower court on appeal 
that this sales agent was "duly authorized" to accept 
notice of claim within the meaning of the policy. 
A recent California case, Kuenstler v. Occidental Life 
Insurance Company, 292 F. Supp. 532 (1968), in the 
United States District Court for the Central District of 
California, again involving an insurance company adds 
additional illumination to the question of who may be a 
duly authorized agent. 
In this case the dispute was over $72.00 in medical 
expenses from a private insurance company who was by 
contract administering benefit provisions for the federal 
government. On a dispute of the claim with the insurance 
carrier and litigation that followed, an issue arose as to 
whether or not this private insurance company was "duly 
authorized as an agent of the United States," it being 
important as effecting the question of whether or not the 
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district court could take jurisdiction to decide the merits 
of a claim against the company. The court, though there 
was no written authorization other than the general busi-
ness relationship of contracting insurance benefits, held 
that the secretary of health, education and welfare was 
authorized to enter into contracts with private insurance 
carriers, and in this case did enter in with such a contract 
with the defendant insurance company, and finally that 
the defendant insurance company while acting in this 
capacity, was a duly authorized agent of the United States 
of America. 
From the foregoing, it is apparent that the courts 
uniformly in disputes involving insurance company claims, 
benefits and questions of whether the companies are 
rightly approving claims have interpreted the provision 
liberally recognizing, (1) the authority of a private insur-
ance carrier as it functions under the Social Security Act, 
(2) recognizing the rights of a claimant where notice was 
given to an agent, though not to the home office on a 
claim, (3) recognizing the authority and the binding na-
ture thereof when a policy holder paid premiums on a 
health policy after a lapse where the money was in fact 
received by the agent, deposited and two weeks passed. 
Based on the foregoing, in the case at hand, it would ap-
pear that the court should sustain a liberal interpretation 
of what constitutes duly authorized and certainly recog-
nize the authority of one acting within the scope of his 
employment in a muncipality, or in a properly licensed 
hospital, or other recognized testing or treatment facility 
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which had a "laboratory technician" whom they regarded 
as not only authorized but qualified. 
The question here is whether the statutes as set forth 
by the legislature of the State of Utah and the grouping 
of a physician, registered nurse, practical nurse, or duly 
authorized laboratory technician contemplates any kind 
of state authorization for the laboratory technician. There 
is no legislative requirement that laboratory technicians 
be licensed within the State of Utah, as is the require-
ment for practical nurses, registered nurses, or physicians. 
In fact, it is the recognized established practice that lab-
oratory technicians function without State licenses and 
so recognized by the legislature in hospitals, in clinics, 
and in this case in the City-County Health Department, 
having received their training and recognition satisfactory 
to those in the related professions and with whom they 
work. The better reading of the statute, under the rules 
of statutory construction, is to read the section as a whole, 
which section provides that the police officer can request 
the laboratory technician, a practical nurse, a registered 
nurse, or a physician, to draw the blood. 
The statute was amended in 1967 to change police 
officer to peace officer and to include a practice nurse 
category. Since peace officer is a broad category and 
includes officers of various municipal, city, county and 
state police agencies, one must conclude that those who 
may act as peace officers are those from the various state, 
city and city-county and municipal categories. Likewise, 
it is reasonable to conclude that a laboratory technician 
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capable and properly authorized by the county govern-
ment and the city government of Salt Lake City, respec-
tively in absence of any state licensing requirement, was 
one "duly authorized" pursuant to the statute and cap-
able of administering the test. It is analogous to conclude 
that as peace officers, representing various city and mu-
nicipal governments act in their own capacity and author-
ity on behalf of the peace-keeping mission and on behalf 
of their work in the broad police power of the state, so 
also Mr. Davis in his city-county employee status could 
act in concert with Trooper Smith pursuant to the statute 
in this case. It must be the conclusion that Mr. Davis, 
an experienced laboratory technician for Salt Lake City 
and Salt Lake County is a "duly authorized laboratory" 
technician to so act under the statute, though he did not 
have on his person or present in court a writing, a certifi-
cate, or a diploma indicating any specific authorization 
from the State of Utah, since none is required by the leg-
islature of the State of Utah, as is the case in the other 
three of the four categories mentioned, vis. practical 
nurses, registered nurses, and physicians. 
It was error on the part of the court to rule that this 
matter should be granted as to the petition of the re-
spondent solely on the technical question of the presence 
of a "duly authorized laboratory technician" in the ab-
sence of state requirements therefore and not to consider 
the matter on its merits. The choice of tests was properly 
with the trooper and had the question been raised by 
either Mr. Reagan or respondent at the time, concerning 
their dispute as to the authority of Mr. Davis, it could 
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have simply been a matter of giving to Mr. Gibb a breath-
alyzer test at that moment. Trooper Smith was author-
ized and capable of giving the test. That alternative did 
not in fact exist because Mr. Reagan advised and Mr. 
Gibb advised that Mr. Gibb would take no tests until 
his attorney was present. A close case on point is a Cali-
fornia case, Westmorland v. Chapman, 74 Cal. Rptr. 363, 
268 C. A. 2d 1 (1969), which upheld a refusal, under Cali-
fornia law, which is similar to Utah's law, except the de-
scriptive terms vary, reads "duly licensed clinical labora-
tory technologist or clinical laboratory bioanalyst." A 
party was challenging the refusal revocation based on 
the failure of the arresting officer to advise him that a 
licensed technician is authorized (emphasis ours) to take 
the blood specimen, the court held that the implied con-
sent law does not impose the duty on the arresting offi-
cer to advise a driver that the licensed technician is au-
thorized to take the blood specimen. 
The lower court committed error further in light of 
the testimony, which was unrdbutted, that it was in-
tended by Mr. Gibb that if the officer did not wait until 
the attorney was present that somehow they could get 
by the hearing or the law requiring him to take such a 
test. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT 
RIGHT TO COUNSEL MEANT THAT RE-
SPONDENT HAD THE RIGHT TO HAVE 
HIS ATTORNEY PHYSICALLY PRESENT 
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IN THE COUNTY JAIL PRIOR TO HIS 
TAKING THE BLOOD TEST AFTER HE 
HAD HAD TWO OPPORTUNITIES TO CON-
VERSE WITH HIS COUNSEL ON THE 
T E L E P H O N E ABOUT MATTERS SUR-
ROUNDING THE IMPLIED CONSENT LAW 
AND HIS SUBMITTING OR REFUSING 
SAID CHEMICAL TEST. 
There is serious doubt in many jurisdictions that 
such a right to counsel exists in the civil aspects of the 
Implied Consent Law where an arrested party must de-
cide whether or not to submit to a type of sobriety test. 
Mills v. Bridges, 471 P. 2d 66, 93 Idaho 679; I. S. § 
49-352; Garcia v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 456 P. 2d 
85; Rust v. Division of Motor Vehicles, et al., 1971, 267 
C. A. 2d 545, 73 Cal. Rptr. 366; Stratikos v. Department 
of Motor Vehicles, (1968) 477 P. 2d 237; People v. Brown, 
485 P. 2d 500; Johnson v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 
485 P. 2d 1258, (Oregon 1971); Campbell v. Superior Court 
in and for Maricopa County, 479 P. 2d 685, 106 Ariz. 542; 
Goodman v. Orr, 1971, 97 Ctl. Rptr. 226, 19 C. A. 3rd 845. 
Utah has not ruled squarely on this issue. 
A recent Colorado case has held that Implied Con-
sent statute is not unconstitutional on grounds that it 
violates right to travel upon state highway, or that it 
constitutes violation of due process by compelling citizen 
to choose either his right to refuse to surrender evidence 
that would help to convict him or his right to retain li-
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cense to drive, or creates a crime of refusing to consent 
to blood test punishable by forfeiture of right to drive 
while denying fundamental rights of person charged with 
criminal offense or that it enforces warrantless and un-
reasonable searches and seizures, or that it sanctions in-
vasion of privacy or privilege against self-incrimination. 
(Emphasis supplied.) Const Art. 2 §§ 3, 7; U. S. C. A. 
Const. Amends. 4, 9; 1967 Perm. Supp., C. R. S., Section 
13-5-30(3) et seq. People v. Brown, 485 P. 2d 500. Brown's 
appeal to the U. S. Supreme Court was dismissed for 
want of a substantial Federal question. 92 S. Ct. 671. 
The Implied Consent Law of California (prior to 
amendment), Idaho and Oregon all have provisions simi-
lar to the language of Utah Section 41-6-44.10, U. C. A. 
1953, as amended, section (a). In several cases before 
the courts of last impression the decisions are unanimous 
that the right to counsel before a decision to submit does 
not exist on the civil aspect. 
Even greater clarification of the "right to counsel" 
and "presence of attorney" is provided by an Oregon 
case on rehearing on the question of presence of his at-
torney, it was there held that the driver's refusal to take 
a breath-analyzer test without having his attorney pres-
ent was a refusal to take the test under the Implied Con-
sent Law, and justified suspension of his driver's license. 
(See Stratikos v. Department of Motor Vehicles, (1968) 
477 P. 2d 237, adhered to and Supplemental 478 P. 2d 
654; also Johnson v. Department of Motor Vehicles, et al., 
485 P. 2d 1258. See also Mills v. Bridges, 471 P. 2d 66, 93 
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Idaho 679; Ent v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 265 
A. C. A. 1073, 71 Cal. Rptr. 726; Finley v. Orr, 262 A. C. A. 
711, 69 Cal. Rptr. 137 
In the Ent and Finley cases the refusals were like-
wise upheld The language in another recent California 
case is supportive (see Funk v. Department of Motor 
Vehicles, 1 Cal. App. 3rd 499, 18 Cal. Rptr.). 
A case on point is the Johnson case, supra, decided 
June 17,1971, where the attorney advised taking a breath-
alyzer when he got there. (Emphasis ours.): The at-
torney did not come. The Court said that any erroneous 
impression (emphasis supplied) upon which petitioner 
relied in failing to take the test (he thought he could re-
main silent), was created by his counsel, not the police, 
and the Court reversed the trial court, holding it was a 
refusal. Johnson v. Department of Motor Vehicles of the 
State of Oregon, Appellant, 485 P. 2d 1285. 
In the case at hand, the respondent not only after 
requesting to do so, contacted his attorney but did so on 
two occasions and the attorney had an opportunity to 
discuss the matter with the respondent. The "right to 
counsel" as relates to the Implied Consent Law does not 
mean the right to the physical presence of the respon-
dent's attorney for monitoring or being present during 
the Implied Consent chemical test. 
Nor does the Hunter case, Hunter v. Dorius, 23 Utah 
2d 122, 458 P. 2d 877, stand for the proposition that the 
respondent or any one in like circumstances is granted 
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the right to the personal presence of his attorney. The 
Hunter case indicates that the respondent, when given 
an opportunity to contact an attorney, by the peace offi-
cer, such as Trooper Smith,, has a reasonable time in 
which to contact the attorney and thereafter has a rea-
sonable time in which to make a decision as to whether 
he will or will not submit to a chemical test. Clearly, the 
Stratikos v. Department of Motor Vehicles case and the 
Johnson v. Motor Vehicles case, supra, both stand for 
the proposition that the driver's refusal to take a test 
without having his attorney present was in fact a refusal 
and further that if there was a misunderstanding in the 
mind of the driver, the respondent herein, this was cre-
ated by the attorney and not by the police officer. Cer-
tainly this is the case in the matter at bar. Though Mr. 
Gibb refused to take the test, the officer made it very 
clear to Mr. Gibb that he did not have a right to have 
his attorney present, nor was it needful for him to be 
present, that he could make his decision after conversing 
with him on the phone, and that if he chose to wait, this 
was not reasonable in the mind of Trooper Smith, and 
if he thought he could continue to postpone the decision 
until the attorney came, and if the officer were not pres-
ent, thereby use that as a basis for getting around the 
law, that was incorrect. 
If correct, such procedure, of course, would be avail-
able to anyone who is attempting to circumvent the re-
quirements of the right they have to drive on the high-
ways of the State of Utah. 
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POINT III. 
RESPONDENT'S ACTION CONSTITUTED 
A REFUSAL UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. § 
41-6-44.10 AND OFFICER SMITH WAS JUS-
TIFIED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE RE-
FUSAL TO SUBMIT TO THE CHEMICAL 
TESTS WAS COMPLETED. 
The Utah cases relating directly to revocation of a 
driver's license for failure to submit to a test under the 
statute are only these: Bean v. State, 12 Ut. 2d 76, 362 
P. 2d 750 (1961); Ringwood v. State, 8 Ut. 2d 287, 333 P. 
2d 943 (1959); Hunter v. Dorius, 23 Ut. 2d 122, 458 P. 2d 
877. The first two of these cases invalidate the revocation 
because the officer failed to give the accused his choice 
of which test of those offered under the statute he would 
take. The 1967 Amendment added a second sentence to 
paragraph a, leaving that decision within reasonable 
grounds with the peace officer. See 41-6-44.10 (a). 
"Any person operating a motor vehicle in 
this state shall be deemed to have given his con-
sent to a chemical test of his breath or blood for 
the purpose of determining the alcoholic con-
tent of his blood, provided that such test is ad-
ministered at the direction of a peace officer 
having reasonable grounds to believe such person 
to have been driving in an intoxicated condition. 
The arresting officer shall determine within rea-
son which of the aforesaid tests shall be admin-
istered" (Emphasis supplied.) 
The Hunter case is distinguishable because although Dr. 
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Hunter was clearly given his choice, he was given a chance 
to contact an attorney which opportunity he took, and 
the court said he should have a reasonable time to do so. 
Here Mr. Gifob asked for an attorney, he had time to call 
one, did talk to his counsel twice, and in the opinion of 
the Trooper had adequate time to decide to take the test. 
Courts have considered that an implied refusal is 
sufficient. Calciano v. Hults, 13 App. Div. 2d 534, 213 
N. Y. S. 2d 500 (1961); Clancy v. Kelly, 7 App. Div. 2d 
820, 180 N. Y. S. 2d 923 (1958). The instant case is not 
rested on solely the implication. 
POINT IV. 
A FAILURE OF ASSENT TO THE REQUEST 
OF THE ARRESTING OFFICER TO TAKE 
A CHEMICAL TEST IS A REFUSAL UN-
DER UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-44.10 (1953), 
AS AMENDED. 
A Nebraska case, Johnson v. Dennis, 187 Neb. 95, 
187 N. W. 2d 605, was a case of an action to contest the 
revocation of a license under the Nebraska Implied Con-
sent law which is similar to Utah's, except the refusal is 
a criminal offense there, rather than a civil offense as is 
the case under Utah law. The Supreme Court held that 
a failure to reply to a direct inquiry as to which test 
should be administered, as provided in the Implied Con-
sent Act, was aquivalent to a refusal to take any of the 
tests. In that case, the driver contended that silence was 
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not a refusal and that the driver had not withdrawn his 
implied consent to a blood test. The Nebraska Supreme 
Court held otherwise and also cited as additional authori-
ties: Bhttner v. Tofany, 312 N. Y. S. 2d 173, 34 A. D. 
2d 1066; State v. Pandoli, 109 N. J. Super. 1, 262 A. 2d 
41; Campbell v. Superior Court, 106 Ariz. 542, 479 P. 2d 
685; DiSalvo v. Williamson, (R. L), 259 A. 2d 671; Clancy 
v. Kelly, 180 N. Y. S. 2d 923, 7 A. D. 2d 820. 
Prerequisites under Utah law are essential to the 
validity of the revocation of a license They are: 
a. The requirement of an appropriate invitation 
to take the test including (a) the prerequisite arrest, (b) 
sufficient probable cause to consider the invitee to be in-
toxicated, and (c) an appropriate opportunity to advise 
which of the tests is to be applied. 
b. The refusal, either expressed or implied, must 
be communicated to, or reasonably presumed by the invit-
ing officer. 
The Court's attention is again drawn to the case of 
Hunter v. Dorius, 23 Utah 2d 122, 458 P. 2d 877, from 
which case appellant feels this case is distinguishable. 
In the case before us, the arresting officer had rea-
sonable cause to believe the petitioner was intoxicated; 
he gave him the appropriate warning, both Miranda and 
the Implied Consent. Conditionally assenting to take the 
test after being advised of his rights constitutes a refusal 
as the test cannot be administered by force. The statute 
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specifically states that on refusing "the test shall not be 
given." 
In the Hunter case, supra, it was a matter of the 
attorney for Dr. Hunter asking on the telephone that he 
be given a blood test after a previous refusal by Dr. Hun-
ter, and the officer refusing to administer it because it 
was too late in his opinion; but both the officer and Dr. 
Hunter were still present at the police station when the 
request for the blood test was made by counsel. 
In the case at bar,, the Trooper had left by the time 
the attorney came. The respondent had talked to his 
attorney (R. 37), the attorney had talked to the officer 
(R. 37, 38), the officer had informed both respondent (R. 
27, 38, 42) and respondent's attorney that he was the only 
car on duty at that time and that respondent should 
make a decision to take the test then, and there was no 
need for the attorney to come to the county jail (R. 41). 
Respondent's answer after being fully advised of his 
rights was that he would not submit to a test unless his 
attorney was present, according to Trooper Smith (R. 
39). However, at one point, to Mr. Davis, he admitted 
affirmatively that he would refuse until his attorney was 
present (R. 36). This testimony was never rebutted or 
changed. Respondent's attorney told Trooper Smith the 
same thing (R. 42). 
The respondent was stopped at 4:01 a.m. Smith 
advised him of his rights at 4:09 a.m. Trooper Smith 
noted the refusal at 5:20 a.m. at the jail. Both Trooper 
Smith and Trooper Tenney left the jail at 5:30 a.m., 
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after presenting the respondent for booking, having previ-
ously filled out the refusal form in part (R. 43) it being 
the Trooper's opinion that a reasonable time had elapsed 
from arrest and consultation with counsel for Mr. Gibb 
to decide whether to submit to the chemical test (R. 43, 
44). 
Attorney Reagan stated for the record he was at the 
jail at 5:25 a.m. He also raised the question as to what 
constituted "right to counsel" and a phone call in his 
opinion, was not such right as pointed out to the Trooper. 
The Trooper reiterated that Mr. Reagan's presence was 
not necessary as far as the refusal was concerned (R. 48). 
In a recent California case, a more extreme case on 
silence, Lampman v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 28 
Cal. App. 3d 927, 105 Cal. Rep. 101 (January 17, 1973), 
the Court held at page 104 that, in face of the driver's 
assertion that the officer should have attempted to ad-
minister one of the tests, to find out whether silence 
meant a refusal in fact it was held the implied consent 
law is designed to be an alternative in the routine cases 
of suspected drunken driving to the use of compulsion 
to obtain a chemical test, i.e., volition is substituted for 
force, and therefore in essence, the officer is not required 
to attempt to administer one of the tests. 
The above case also sets forth as the principal issue 
on appeal as to whether Miss Lampman's silence in the 
face of repeated requests to submit to a chemical test 
constituted a failure to submit to a test under their code. 
The court held her silence infers (a refusal), the same 
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meaning as the driver in the Cahall case. The court re-
fers to this California case, Cahall v. Department of Mo-
tor Vehicles, 16 Cal. App. 3d, in explaining their hold-
ing: "There the driver, in response to a request for a 
choice of test said Tm not even going to give you an 
answer.'" The court held in Cahall that the statement 
amounted to a failure to submit to a chemical test. 
This same Lampman case holds as a collateral matter 
on the question that she was confused by the officer's 
advice, that the true test in determining whether the 
driver's failure to submit as a result of confusion "is not 
the driver's state of mind, but the fair meaning to be 
given her response to the request that she submit to a 
chemical test." Supra, 105 Cal. Rep. 103. 
In the case at hand, the mere fact that Mr. Gibb said 
he was not refusing, would not negate the fact that his 
choice to do nothing until his attorney came was a re-
fusal. The very purpose of the Implied Consent Law is 
to provide a volitional solution, not one of compulsion on 
the taking of the chemical test, to which Mr. Gibb and 
every other driver has given his consent. The statute 
permits the suspected party to withdraw his consent. In 
this case, Mr. Gibb's failure to assent to the test does 
just that, and constitutes a refusal; further, the presence 
of Mr. Lynn Davis to administer the test as one author-
ized by the health officials of Salt Lake County, was a 
person "duly authorized" as contemplated by Utah Code 
Ann. § 41-6-44.10 (1953), as amended, and is not a rea-
sonable excuse to relieve Mr. Gibb from compliance with 
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the request for a chemical test and the results flowing 
therefrom. 
POINT V. 
THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN NOT RE-
QUIRING THE REVOCATION OF THE RE-
SPONDENT'S DRIVER'S LICENSE TO RE-
MAIN IN FORCE UNDER THE PRESENT 
FACTS. 
The record reveals that, though the respondent al-
leges he did not refuse the test or tests, Trooper Smith's 
testimony and Mr. Davis' testimony (R. 26, 38, 39, 41) 
was to the effect that by not taking the test until his 
attorney came he may get around the law. 
The statute, Section 41-6-44.10, Utah Code Ann. 
(1953) does not require the officer to invite the respon-
dent to take the test more than once. In this case the 
officer invited him to take the test on two occasions and 
in each case the respondent refused, until his attorney 
was present. The Trooper felt that adequate opportunity 
for counsel and adequate time for a decision had elapsed. 
At that point, under the statute, it was the officer's 
obligation that "the test shall not be given and the arrest-
ing officer shall advise the person of his rights under this 
section." Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10 (1953), as 
amended. This the officer did. 
We submit that the Judge in the trial court erred 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
26 
in not requiring the revocation to remain valid under 
the circumstances. 
CONCLUSION 
Fundamental to the issues of this case are the two 
questions basic to the ruling of Judge Wilkins. One, that 
there was no right to adequate consultation with counsel. 
Two, that the question of a "duly authorized laboratory 
technician" was ambiguous and not well defined and that 
a city and county authorized laboratory technician was 
not one authorized by the state to act pursuant to Sec-
tion 41-6-44.10 (f). Taking the second point first, the 
appellant respectfully submits that inasmuch as the Utah 
State Legislature has not spoken to the point that a state 
authorization, licensing, or certification for laboratory 
tchnicians within the state is required, that no state re-
quirement exists and therefore, at the time the statute 
was changed in 1967, to include registered nurses, practi-
cal nurses and "duly authorized laboratory technicians" 
that custom and usage at the time of the enactment of 
that legislation would require that any proper laboratory 
technician qualified by the hospital, laboratory, city or 
county government in which they were employed or 
served, was a "duly authorized laboratory technician" 
and that the one at court, Mr. Davis, was such an indi-
vidual, meeting the statutory requirement. 
If the Court holds with the appellant on that point, 
then the first point comes into play, inasmuch as the 
trial court said that they had decided the matter on the 
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merits. On this point, appellant respectfully submits that 
the facts demonstrate that respondent had adequate time 
to contact his attorney, did in fact so contact him did 
converse with him on two occasions from the jail, and 
thereafter had an adequate time in which to decide 
whether he would or would not take the chemical test 
pursuant to the request of the peace officer. The respon-
dent's failure to assent to a test in what was concluded 
to be a reasonable time by the peace officer, without the 
physical presence of his attorney, was properly concluded 
to be and reported by the Trooper as a refusal. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
M. REID RUSSELL 
Assistant Attorney General 
BERNARD M. TANNER 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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